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NATURAL RESOURCES: THE VIEW FROM ABOVE
ANNE

L.

BRIGHAM

INTRODUCTION

REMOTE SENSING' is being used with increasing frequency around the world for a variety of purposes.
Specific uses of remote sensing data include the following:
monitoring floods and landslides, monitoring weather
patterns, detecting and measuring pollution, and locating
natural resources. This Comment will focus on the use of
remote sensing in the detection of oil and gas and other
minerals.
American courts have not yet addressed the legal implications of satellite remote sensing and its use in exploration for natural resources, but they have addressed the
rights of parties in the context of geophysical exploration.
Therefore, this analysis will begin with an examination of
traditional geophysical seismic surveys, and will then
move down the continuum to airborne geophysical
surveys, and finally to satellite remote sensing. Airborne
surveys and remote sensing present some common legal
issues. For instance, is there a duty to disclose to a mineral owner that his property has been sensed? Should the
owner of the minerals be compensated for the sensing of
his land? Should the mineral owner have access to the
I Remote sensing usually refers to measurements of the earth's natural radiation or radiation generated from a source in the sensor which has been reflected
back from the earth. Nonradiation measurements, such as measurements of the
earth's magnetic field, are also included within remote sensing. The measurements may be taken by high flying airplanes or by satellite. R. SHERIFF, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF EXPLORATION GEOPHYSICS 183 (1982); see infra note 66.
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data? The development of law and policy has not kept up
with the rapid technological advances in satellite remote
sensing or in geophysical exploration. Because remote
sensing will play a key role in future exploration for increasingly scarce natural resources, it is important that the
United States firmly establish a legal framework for addressing these issues.
This Comment will examine the legal considerations
and policies relevant to satellite remote sensing, and how
they parallel the law and policies in the area of geophysical exploration. As a starting point for analysis, Part I discusses geophysical exploration conducted without the
mineral owner's authorization, and some proposed theories of relief. Part II focuses on remote sensing, including
the historical and technical background of LANDSAT,
and the applications of remote sensing in exploration.
Part II also contrasts the policies and concerns of the
United States with those of foreign countries, and examines proposed theories of relief for the mineral owner
whose land is sensed without his permission. Finally, Part
III discusses whether exploration companies have a duty
to disclose to the mineral owner that the land has been
surveyed or sensed.
I.

GEOPHYSICAL EXPLORATION

In exploring new areas for oil and gas, geophysical
surveys are frequently conducted to provide additional information before drilling a well. 2 Geophysical exploration is also extremely valuable in locating other natural
resources, such as coal, uranium, and other metals. The
technology in geophysics is rapidly advancing.4 As tech2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS (1987).
A geophysical survey is "[t]he accurate measurement and recording of certain physical quantities in the outer rock shell of the earth, the object being to learn the nature and
contour of underground geological structures." Id. at 414.
See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. See generally Greenhalgh, Shallow
Seismic Reflection Investigations of Coal in the Sydney Basin, 51 GEopHYsICs 1426 (1986)
(discussing the use of geophysical methods in exploring for coal).
4 "Seismic representations of the subsurface are getting clearer and more accu-
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nological capabilities improve, and locating already scarce
natural resources becomes more difficult, geophysical exploration is likely to play an increasingly important role in
the future.
A.

Unauthorized Geophysical Exploration

Unauthorized geophysical exploration, or geophysical
trespass, can be defined as an intrusion onto private property to conduct geophysical operations without authorization.- The intruder may be held liable to the landowner
as a trespasser. It is well established that the right to explore for oil and gas using geophysical methods is a valuable, legally protected property right which belongs to the
mineral owner. 6 Under existing case law, a landowner is
entitled to recover damages for an actual surface entry
onto his property to conduct an unauthorized survey.7
Several commentators have noted that "trespass" is not
an appropriate theory for recovery. 8 The key problem is
rate thanks to improvements in seismic acquisition, 3-D techniques, interactive
computer workstations, color plotting, wavelet processing, migration, and other
wave equation techniques." Fritz, High Tech Seismic Key to Future, AM. A. PETROLEUM GEOLOGISTS EXPLORER, Feb. 1987, at 1, 10.
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 2, at 415.
Several cases have specifically found the right of exploration to be a valuable
property right, belonging exclusively to the land or mineral owner, and have held
an unauthorized invader liable as a trespasser for damages to the property. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Ohio Oil Co. v.
Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943); Franklin v. Arkansas Oil Fuel Co., 218 La.
987, 51 So. 2d 600 (1951); Holcombe v. Superior Oil Co., 213 La. 684, 35 So. 2d
457 (1948); Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940);
Wilson v. Texas Co., 237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
7 See Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co., 213 S.W.2d 707, 709, 713 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948). Three possible measurements of damages are the following: (1)
"[t]he value of the right to enter on the land for the survey," (2) "[t]he loss of
speculative value by reason of the unfavorable publicity resulting from the survey," and (3) "[tlhe value to the trespasser of the information it obtained by the
geophysical trespass." H. WILLIAMS & C. MYERS, OIL AND GAS LAw § 230 (1988).
"On an appropriate showing of facts, punitive damages for geophysical trespass
may be granted." Id.
8 See Christiansen, Oil and Gas: Improper Geophysical Exploration - Filling in the
Remedial Gap, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 903 (1979); Rice, Wrongful Geophysical Exploration,
44 Morrr. L. REV. 53 (1983); Slater, The Surreptitious Geophysical Survey: An Interference with Prospective Advantage, 15 PAC. L.J. 381 (1984); Warner, Oil & Gas: Recovery
for Wrongful Geophysical Exploration - Catching up with Technology, 23 WASHBURN L.J.
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that the law in the area of geophysical trespass has not
kept pace with the rapid technological advances made recently in geophysical exploration. The case law clearly allows recovery when the unauthorized survey involves an
actual, physical invasion of the surface, but exploration
companies commonly conduct geophysical surveys without ever touching the surveyed property. Therefore,
surveys conducted from neighboring land, surrounding
public roads, or from the air present a unique problem;
one which the courts have not yet resolved. 9
B.

Unauthorized Geophysical Operations Conducted Without
Actual Surface Entry

1. Surveys Conductedfrom Surrounding Roads or Adjacent
Property
It is unclear from the existing case law whether unauthorized geophysical operations conducted without an actual invasion of the surface constitute a trespass. In Ohio
Oil Co. v. Sharp,10 Ohio Oil Company was actively exploring for oil and gas by conducting geophysical surveys, in107 (1983). As one author stated, defining geophysical trespass as unauthorized
geophysical operations associated with a physical invasion is a "logical non sequitur." Rice, supra, at 59.
The physical entry ...

occurs on the surface of the property and is a

trespass against the surface estate, not the mineral estate. Thus, the
only "trespass" committed against the mineral estate continues to
be the vibrations from seismic testing, which ...

[do] not constitute

a trespass. It is apparent that the wrongful exploration committed
against the mineral owner is something other than a trespass.
Id. at 59. For an analysis of case law and secondary authority supporting the proposition that vibrations from seismic testing do not constitue a trespass against the
mineral estate, see Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co., 213 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948).
!, See Sharp, 135 F.2d at 303 (assuming for the purpose of argument that an
unauthorized survey conducted from public roads adjacent to the property constituted a trespass); Kennedy, 213 S.W.2d at 713 (conducting geophysical operations
from property adjacent to the plaintiff's land, without actually entering plaintiff's
land, did not constitute trespass). Although no case law specifically addresses the
issue of whether an unauthorized aerial survey constitutes a trespass, see Ratliffv.
Beard, 416 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (the court concluded, without
explaining its reasoning, that aerial photography did not constitute trespass of the
mineral lessee's rights).
,o 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943).
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terpreting the data, and then acquiring leases on property
believed to be productive." Ohio hired a service company to conduct a geophysical survey from the public
highway abutting the land in question.' 2 Although the oil
company obtained permission from the surface owners to
conduct the survey, it did not obtain the consent or approval of the mineral owners.'" The survey was conducted openly, in accordance with standard industry
practice, and the surveyors did not enter onto private
property.' 4 When the seismic data indicated potential oil
and gas reserves, an employee of the service company
communicated Ohio's confidential information to Sharp,
who obtained a lease on the acreage before Ohio could do
so.

15

Ohio Oil Company sued Sharp, seeking to impress a
constructive trust on the leases covering the property in
question.' 6 The trial court dismissed the case, finding
that Ohio had improperly obtained the data through a
trespass, and therefore could not bring an equitable action against Sharp.' 7 The appellate court reversed and
remanded.18
The appellate court noted that the issue at hand was not
the wrongful invasion of the mineral owner's rights, but
whether Ohio's actions precluded it from seeking equitable relief.' 9 The court conceded that, assuming the subsurface vibrations from the tests were themselves
sufficient to constitute a trespass, the unauthorized
surveys constituted a trespass against the rights of the
mineral interest owners. 20 The court concluded, however, that Ohio was an innocent trespasser who acted in
1 Id. at 305.
I2
Id.

'.
14

Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 305-06.

, Id. at 304.
7

Id.

- Id. at 309.

- Id. at 308.
Id.

20
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good faith, and was therefore entitled to seek relief in a
court of equity. 2' A concurring judge disagreed with the
majority's finding that Ohio trespassed on the oil and gas
rights of the mineral owner, stressing that no actual invasion of the subsurface occurred. 2 Because the court did
not directly address the issue of liability for unauthorized
geophysical operations in the absence of a surface invasion, it is difficult to predict how a court might resolve this
issue in the future.2 3
In Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co. ,24 the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that unauthorized geophysical operations did not constitute a trespass in the absence of an actual invasion of the surface.2 5
In Kennedy, the General Geophysical Company conducted
seismic operations on land adjacent to Kennedy's land,
sometimes within ten to fifteen feet of the boundary.26
Kennedy brought suit claiming the vibrations from the
seismic testing travelled through his property, constituting a trespass. 27 The court concluded that no trespass
Id. at 309.
Id.
I do not think that a geological investigation of a substantial area,
conducted upon lands rightfully entered, constitutes a trespass upon
adjoining land or a wrong against the owner thereof, or of the oil
and gas rights therein, where there is no actual entry upon such adjoining land, although it may disclose geological information with
respect thereto. To hold otherwise would greatly impede geological
investigations which are essential to the discovery and development
of oil and gas ....
The owner of a tract of land who drilled an oil
and gas well near his boundary line would obtain geological information respecting adjoining lands but surely he would not be guilty
of a trespass upon such lands or a wrong against the owner thereof.
Id. at 310.
23 See Christiansen, supra note 8, at 906.
24 213
S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Warner, supra note 8, at 110-11
("Since the court avoided a clear holding on the issue of liability for geophysical
exploration in the absence of a physical trespass, Sharp gives only an indication of
how the Tenth Circuit might treat such actions in the future.")
2 -, Kennedy, 213 S.W.2d at 709, 713.
26 Id. at 708-09.
General Geophysical had originally requested to conduct the
operations on Kennedy's land, but when Kennedy demanded payment for the
right to survey his land, General Geophysical decided to conduct the surveys from
the land adjacent to Kennedy's property instead. Id.
27 Id. at 708.
21
22
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had been committed on Kennedy's land, basing its decision on the absence of an actual intrusion onto Kennedy's
land and the absence of evidence of any damage to either
the surface or subsurface.28
Despite the Sharp court's concession for the purpose of
argument that the unauthorized operations conducted
from an abutting road constituted a trespass, commentators have concluded from the case law that an action for
geophysical trespass requires an actual physical entry on
the surveyed property. 29 The further removed from the
surveyed property the exploration company is when conducting its operations, the more difficult it will likely be
for the mineral owner to bring an action based on geophysical trespass. Unauthorized operations conducted
from adjacent lands are one step removed from operations conducted on the land, and surveys conducted from
the air are even further down on the continuum.
Airborne Surveys

2.

Unlike the previously discussed area of seismic surveys
conducted from adjacent property or surrounding public
Id. at 709. The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion of law
[t]hat the mere fact that [General Geophysical Company] conducted
geophysical operations on land adjacent to... [Kennedy's] land and
thereby obtained information which they considered of value in determining the probable presence or absence of oil, gas, or other
minerals under the land explored, cannot form a basis for [Kennedy's] claim for ... [damages], it not being shown that any trespass
of [Kennedy's] land was committed by [General Geophysical], or
that any injury was done... by such geophysical operations on adjacent land.
Id. The appellate court emphasized that General Geophysical Company did not
"set up a receiving set so near [Kennedy's] land that a straight line drawn on the
surface of the ground from the one shot-point from which waves were to be received by the receiving set crossed any part of ... [Kennedy's] land." Id. at 713.
29 Christiansen, supra note 8, at 907-08 ("The commentators today generally
agree that in the absence of entry upon or injury to the property of the nonconsenting landowner, the conduct of a geophysical explorer on adjoining lands is
not actionable.") (footnotes omitted); Warner, supra note 8, at 111-12 ("The conclusion that may be drawn from the cases [including Sharp and Kennedy] and commentators is that an action based on geophysical trespass requires an actual
physical trespass or some direct identifiable injury to the property.") (footnotes
omitted).
28
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roads, there is no case law discussing unauthorized geophysical surveys conducted from the air. Yet, aeromagnetic and airborne gravity surveys30 play a very
important role in exploring for natural resources, 3 ' and
are being used with increasing frequency worldwide. 2 In
addressing the rights of the landowner whose property is
surveyed in this way without his knowledge, it is important to note a major difference between airborne surveys
and conventional seismic surveys. A seismic survey creates
waves from an energy source, and their travel time
through the subsurface is recorded for interpretation. 3
Airborne surveys, on the other hand, do not generate
waves at all, but merely measure variations in the earth's
magnetic and gravitational fields. 4 Therefore, surveys
conducted by air are arguably less intrusive than conven30 An airborne gravity survey measures "the gravitational field at a series of
different locations over an area of interest. The objective in exploration work is to
associate variations with differences in the distribution of densities and hence of
rock types." R. SHERIFF, supra note 1, at 100. An aeromagnetic survey measures
the magnetic field from an aircraft "at a series of different locations over an area
of interest, usually with the objective of locating concentrations of magnetic
materials or of determining [the] depth to [the] basement [rock]." Id. at 2, 135.
31 Shirley, Searchingfor Smaller Structures - Aeromagnetics Flying New Course, AM. A.
PETROLEUM GEOLOGISTS EXPLORER, Sept. 1987, at 16-17. Aeromagnetics generated enthusiasm about the possibilities of finding new, smaller structures in mature oil and gas regions. Id. Some discoveries have been made in an area
covering parts of Oklahoma and Kansas from anomalies that appeared on the
magnetic surveys. Id.; see also Cordell & Knepper, Aeromagnetic Images: Fresh Insight
to the Buried Basement, Rolla Quadrangle, Southeast Missouri, 52 GEOPHYSICS 218, 231

(1987) (In a recent study conducted in Missouri, aeromagnetic data formed patterns which appeared to relate to the basement geology, and possibly to the distribution of lead-zinc-copper mineralization); Tucker, Aeromagnetic Regional Survey of
Onshore Australia, 53 GEOPHYSICS 254 (1988) (Aeromagnetic data is used extensively by the exploration industry in Australia).
.2
Senti, Special Report Geophysical Activity in 1987, GEOPHYSICS: LEADING EDGE
EXPLORATION, Aug. 1988, at 33. Between 1986 and 1987, the amount spent for
worldwide airborne surveys increased by 10%, with a major increase in the
amount spent on surveys used in petroleum exploration. Id. at 42. In the United
States alone, $6.3 million was spent on airborne surveys to explore for petroleum,
and $1.9 million was spent on surveys to detect other minerals. Id. at 45. Canada,
South America, Africa, The Far East, and Europe also made large expenditures on
airborne surveys. Id.
3 R. SHERIFF, supra note 1, at 192.
14

Id. at 100, 135; see supra note 30 for a discussion of airborne surveys.
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tional seismic surveys. 5
In the United States, service companies conducting aerial surveys are governed by the Federal Aviation Act, and
the guidelines are very broad. 6 Unless the flights over
the property substantially interfere with the landowner's
use and enjoyment of his land,37 it is unlikely that he will
have an action against the exploration company. To
maintain a successful suit for geophysical trespass, the
landowner must show either an actual invasion on the surface of his property, 8 or at least that vibrations travelled
through his property. As he can show neither in the case
of an aerial survey, it appears that the landowner has no
relief.39 In response to this type of situation, commentators have suggested alternate theories of recovery for the
35Warner, supra note 8, at 115 n.70 (concluding that aeromagnetic, airborne
gravity, and remote sensing devices are not "as obnoxious or obtrusive of an appropriation of the landowner's rights as a seismic survey conducted from adjacent
lands or along public highways.").
- The FAA recognizes and declares that every United States citizen has "a public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the United
States." 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). "Navigable airspace" is defined as the "airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by [CAB]
regulations." 49 U.S.C. § 1301(29) (1982).
The FAA does not address the use of the navigable airspace for commercial
purposes, such as aerial photography and airborne surveys. Arguably, these uses
do not fall within the definition of "transit" as contemplated by the FAA.
Whether the use of the navigable airspace for conducting airborne surveys goes
beyond the scope of the public's easement is an issue which has not yet been
addressed.
37 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946). In Causby, the plaintiff
owned a chicken farm near an airport. Military planes flying over his property
were so noisy that the chickens panicked and 150 of them flew into the walls and
were killed. Id. at 259. The plaintiff brought suit claiming he could no longer use
his property as a commercial chicken farm. The Supreme Court remanded for
further findings to determine whether the government had taken a permanent, or
temporary easement over the property. Id. at 268. The Court noted that the
flights over private property did not constitute a taking unless the flights were so
low and frequent as to directly and immediately interfere with the enjoyment and
use of the land. Id. at 261.
38 See supra note 9 (list of cases which discuss whether an actual entry onto private property is required to constitute trespass); see also Ratliff v. Beard, 416 So.
2d 307, 309 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (where the plaintiff alleged the defendants had
trespassed on the leased property "by photographing and aerial viewing," the
court concluded, without explaining its reasoning, that "these activities did not
constitute trespass of the rights of the mineral lessee, or cause any damages.").
1,,
Warner, supra note 8, at 115 ("The sophistication of modern geophysical ex-
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without his

Proposed Theories of Recovery for Unauthorized Surveys

Several theories of recovery have been proposed to
compensate a landowner for unauthorized geophysical
exploration conducted without a surface trespass: trade
secrets, invasion of privacy, nuisance, interference with
prospective advantage, and the suggested new tort of
wrongful appropriation of the right to explore.40
Whether any of these theories will be accepted is uncertain since the courts have not addressed these theories in
relation to unauthorized geophysical operations.
1.

Trade Secrets

Some commentators recommend that the courts use the
law of trade secrets to fashion a new remedy for wrongful
geophysical exploration. 4 ' Trade secrets may be defined
as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it."' 42 The case of E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher appears to strengthen the
argument that trade secret law should apply.
ploration techniques has placed the nontrespassory, unauthorized taking of geophysical information beyond the reach of recognized theories of recovery.").
40 See Christiansen, supra note 8, at 908-14
(focusing on the law of trade
secrets); Rice, supra note 8, at 61-64 (examining the following theories: quasi-contract, disparagement of quality of title, invasion of privacy, and trade secrets);
Slater, supra note 8, at 394-408 (considering nuisance, the right to privacy, the law
of trade secrets, and interference with prospective advantage as possible protections for the mineral owner); Warner, supra note 8, at 118-27 (discussing the application of trade secrets, invasion of privacy, nuisance, interference with
prospective advantage, and a new tort, "the wrongful appropriation of the right to
explore.").
41 Christiansen, supra note 8, at 909-11; Rice, supra note 8, at 63-64; Slater, supra
note 8, at 399-401; Warner, supra note 8, at 118-21. It is important to note that
each of these commentators recognized that the right to prevent unauthorized
geophysical exploration does not meet the definitional requirements of a trade
secret.
42 M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 3.01 (1989) (citing the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 comment b (1939)) (emphasis in original).
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In E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,4 3 Dupont
alleged that its highly secret method of producing methanol was a trade secret which the company was attempting
to protect. 44 While DuPont's plant was still under construction, parts of the secret process were left exposed to
the sky. The Christophers circled the plant taking aerial
photographs of the process, and later delivered the
photos to a third party.4 5 DuPont filed suit against the
Christophers alleging they had wrongfully appropriated
DuPont's trade secrets. 46 The court rejected the Christophers' argument that because they had acted in public airspace, in compliance with government aviation standards
and not in a fraudulent or illegal manner, they had committed no "actionable wrong."' 4 7 In holding the aerial
photographs were an improper means of discovering DuPont's trade secrets, the court noted that reasonable precautions should be taken to ensure secrecy, but the holder
of the secret should not be required to build a roof over
its plant during construction.48
The holding in Christopher appears applicable to a situation in which aerial surveys are taken without the mineral
owner's permission, since "reasonable precautions" will
not stop an exploration company from conducting such
surveys. The court, however, did not indicate that its
holding should apply outside the area of industrial espionage, and there are problems with applying the trade secret theory in the case of mineral ownership. First, trade
secret law applies to protect the confidentiality of information which is of a commercial nature and gives the holder
of the information a competitive advantage in the operation of his business.49 Commonly, a mineral owner is not
in the exploration business, but is a farmer or rancher. He
43 431
4

F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
Id. at 1013.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 1014.

47

Id.

48 Id.
49

at 1015-16.
Warner, supra note 8, at 120.
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will not have developed information of a commercial nature as to the existence and potential of his mineral estate.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that courts would stretch
trade secret protection to cover such a mineral owner. 50
Also, the need for trade secret protection typically arises
between commercial competitors. The seismic exploration company and the mineral owner are not the type of
commercial competitors typically referred to under trade
secret law. 51
2.

Invasion of Privacy

Another proposal is to allow the landowner to recover
damages for unauthorized geophysical exploration based
on an invasion of privacy. 2 One commentator suggests
that geophysical trespass can be analogized to two forms
of invasion of privacy: unwarranted intrusion into an
individual's solitude, and public disclosure of private
facts.53 A third type of privacy tort, appropriation of the
plaintiff's name or likeness, has also been suggested. 54 It
is recognized, however, that no one of these three theories is entirely applicable to unauthorized geophysical operations.55 Perhaps the key difficulty in applying privacy
concepts to unauthorized geophysical operations is that
50

Id. at 121. One commentator noted:
[w]hile an analysis of trade secret principles is helpful in understanding how liability may attach to those who wrongfully appropriate information, one could conclude that the courts would be reluctant to
expand trade secret protection to cover mineral owners who have
not developed, in a commercial context, information as to the mineral potential of their subsurface estate.

Id.
51Id. at 120. But see Christiansen, supra note 8, at 914 ("To the extent that trade
secret law derives from a policy favoring the protection of competitive, economically valuable information, the principles . . . should apply with equal force to
protect the property owner's right to exercise or dispose of his privilege of geophysical survey.").
-12 Rice, supra note 8, at 63; Slater, supra note 8, at 397-98; Warner, supra note 8,
at 121-22.
5-1Slater, supra note 8, at 397-98.

Warner, supra note 8, at 121.
m Rice, supra note 8, at 63; Slater, supra note 8, at 397; Warner, supra note 8, at
121-22.
-14
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privacy law is generally thought of as protecting the rights
of an individual, as opposed to rights that arise out of real
property.56
Nuisance

3.

A third proposed theory of relief for an unauthorized
geophysical survey is the law of nuisance.5 7 A nontrespassory invasion into a mineral owner's use and enjoyment of
his land may amount to a private nuisance. 58 The use and
enjoyment of a mineral estate is usually dependent upon
the exploration for and production of the minerals.59
Once an unauthorized survey is conducted, the mineral
owner has lost his opportunity to sell the right to explore
on his property and, depending on the survey results, he
may lose his ability to lease the land as well.60 In granting
relief under the nuisance theory, courts have traditionally
required a tangible injury which damages the property or
interferes with the occupancy of the property. 6 ' For this
reason, the law of nuisance is not an appropriate remedy
for an unauthorized survey.
4. A New Theory of Recovery
Several commentators have expressed concern that the
traditional legal theories of trespass, trade secrets, invasion of privacy, and nuisance, are inadequate in protecting a mineral owner from an unauthorized survey of his
land. 62 Two solutions have been proposed. The first recommendation is that the courts recognize a new tort, the
wrongful appropriation of the right to explore.63 The
boundaries of this proposed new tort are not defined, but
-6 Warner, supra note 8, at 122.
57 Slater, supra note 8, at 394.
58

Id.

59 Id. at 395.
- id. at 396.
61 Id.
62 See Christiansen, supra note 8, at 914; Rice, supra note 8, at 64, 70; Slater,
supra note 8, at 408-10; Warner, supra note 8, at 126-27.
63 Rice, supra note 8, at 70.
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apparently it would have broad application for "wrongful
nontrespassory geophysical exploration. "64 The second
proposed theory of recovery for unauthorized surveys is
the tort of "interference with prospective advantage.

' 65

The courts have not recognized either of these proposals.
The purpose of this Comment is to suggest that while
these recommendations for imposing tort liability may be
appropriate for unauthorized seismic surveys conducted
on the ground, they cannot be appropriately extended
into the area of remote sensing.
II.

A.

REMOTE SENSING

Historical Development of LANDSA T

Remote sensing is most simply defined as the "surveying, mapping, exploration, exploitation, and testing of
terrain features without contacting them. ' 66 On July 23,
1972, the United States Civil Land Observation and Satellite Program (LANDSAT) launched the first satellite
designed to conduct remote sensing, LANDSAT 1.67 Additional and improved satellites, LANDSATs 2, 3, and 4,
- Warner, supra note 8, at 127.
65 Slater, supra note 8, at 402-03 (tort liability to protect a landowner's reason-

able expectation of economic advantage from a misappropriation of confidential
commercial information).
- Feder, Contemporary Remote Sensing for Hydrocarbon Exploration, Development
With Case Histories, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 160. For a more technical
discussion of remote sensing, see 1 MANUAL OF REMOTE SENSING at v (R. Reeves
ed. 1975):
[t]he Field of remote sensing may be defined ... [as encompassing]
techniques that obtain reliable information about the properties of
surfaces and objects from a distance. This may be accomplished by
measuring (1) electromagnetic radiation . . . from the surfaces or
objects, (2) other force fields such as gravity or magnetic created or
modified by them, or (3) mechanical ... vibrations or waves emanating from, being transmitted through, or reflected from them.
Id.
67 Fillippone, PracticalApplications of Remote Sensing, GEOPHYSIcs: LEADING EDGE
EXPLORATION, Dec. 1987, at 16.
LANDSAT data is extremely useful in locating mineral/energy resources in the following ways: (1) detection of large scale geologic
features which may be associated with the accumulation of hydrocarbons, (2) detection of surface tonal anomalies (alterations in the soil
or vegetation caused by geochemical processes, and which may indi-
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were also funded solely by the government. 68 In 1981,
the Reagan Administration announced its plan to transfer
LANDSAT operations to the private sector.69 On March
1, 1984, NASA launched LANDSAT 5.70

Four months

later, Reagan signed the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, 7' which provided for the sale of
LANDSAT to the private sector, with the intention that
LANDSAT 5 would be the last remote sensing satellite
fully funded by the federal government.72 In 1985, the
government awarded the Earth Observation Satellite
Company (EOSAT), an RCA/Hughes Aircraft joint venture, a contract to assume operation of the current LANDSAT systems and to develop new systems.73 Shifting the
operation of LANDSAT to the private sector caused uncertainty about the continued existence of the program,
cate oil and gas seeps), (3) detection of offshore marine oil seeps,
and (4) detection of surface exposures of minerals and metals.
Halbouty, Application of LANDSAT Imagery to Petroleum and Mineral Exploration, 60
AM. Assoc. PETROLEUM GEOLOGISTS BULL. 745 (1976).
- Fillippone, supra note 67, at 17.
- Note, Legal and Foreign Policy Implications of the LANDSAT CommercializationAct,
24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 106 (1985).
- Joyner & Miller, Selling Satellites: The Commercializationof LANDSAT,
INT'L LJ. 63 (1985) [hereinafter Joyner].
71 Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.

26 HARV.

§§ 42014292 (Supp. V 1987) (the "Act").
712Joyner, supra note 70, at 63.
LANDSAT Program to Continue, GEOPHYSICS: LEADING EDGE EXPLORATION,
I1
June 1988, at 49. From 1972 until the commercialization of LANDSAT in 1985,
American taxpayers "paid for, launched, maintained, and sold data from [LANDSAT]." Koger, A Close Look at Photogeology, Remote Sensing, and Image Analysis, OIL &
GAS J., Dec. 5, 1988, at 54, 57. Today, EOSAT is responsible for the sale of remote sensing data. Id. It is interesting to note that in addition to the major oil
companies, independent oil and gas explorationists are purchasing remote sensing data as well. Id. These independents are less likely to have the computer
systems necessary to process raw satellite data into a useable image, and so they
rely on the work of consultants. Id. Remote sensing consultants may buy and
interpret pre-made imagery sold at the Earth Resources Observations System
(EROS) Data Center, or they may buy the data in digital form for custom imagery.
Id.
The United States Geological Survey operates the EROS Data Center at Sioux
Falls, South Dakota. Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of
TransborderData Flow in Transition, 36 VAND. L. REV. 985, 1009 (1983). LANDSAT
gathers the raw data and transmits it to EROS. Id. EROS then processes the data
and sells it at a price based on the cost of reproducing the data. Id.
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and just recently, LANDSAT came perilously close to
termination.74
In 1987, in an effort to positively influence the immediate and future existence of the LANDSAT program, private-sector users of LANDSAT, representatives of
EOSAT, and a variety of federal agency witnesses met for
two days of congressional hearings. 7 5 The hearings focused on three major concerns:
First, that the U.S. pioneered remote-sensing and, after an
expenditure of $1.5 billion, [was] about to give it up to
France and Japan; Second, that LANDSAT has important
applications for our national security, our energy security,
and our national competitiveness; and Third, if the U.S.
[hoped] to remain a player in the remote sensing arena, a
minimum of two satellites -

LANDSATs 6 and 7

-

[needed] to be funded.76
A year after these hearings, the United States Department
of Commerce and EOSAT agreed to continue the LANDSAT earth remote sensing program into the 1990s by entering into a new contract on March 31, 1988. 77 This
agreement provides for the commercial development and
construction of LANDSAT 6, the continued worldwide
market development of LANDSAT products, and the op.4 A great deal of uncertainty about the future of LANDSAT existed from November 1986 until March 1988. On March 31, 1988, the United States Department of Commerce and EOSAT entered into a new contract to continue the
LANDSAT program. LANDSA T Program to Continue, supra note 73, at 49. Had the
1988 agreement not been reached, the programs for LANDSATs 6 and 7 would
have been terminated April 1, 1988. LANDSAT Near Termination?, GEOPHYSICS:
LEADING EDGE EXPLORATION, Mar. 1988, at 44. Several circumstances led to the
near termination of LANDSAT including: 1) the Senate Appropriations Committee's recommendation that LANDSAT be terminated and the funds applied to the
National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration's weather satellite program; 2)
NASA's withdrawal of support for LANDSAT due to budgetary reasons; and 3)
the fact that LANDSAT's primary use is in commercial geologic applications,
rather than general research. LINDSAT Near Termination?, supra, at 44.
1. The Future of the LANDSA T System, 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Natural
Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment and the Subcomm. on InternationalScientific Cooperation of the Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) [hereinafter Hearings].
7,; Id. at 167-68 (testimony of the honorable Ralph Hall).
77 LNDSAT Program to Continue, supra note 73, at 49.
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eration of LANDSATs 4 and 5 by EOSAT.7 8
The 1988 contract is simply a revision of the earlier
1985 contract. 79 After a total cost to the government of
$220 million for the construction of LANDSAT 6 and its
associated ground systems, the proposed satellite is expected to launch in June 1991. 80 EOSAT must return to
the government the first $2.5 million of marketing revenues each year, until a total reimbursement of $10.8 million is made.8 1 EOSAT president, C. P. Williams, stated
that "[t]his agreement assures the [United States] of continued leadership in satellite remote sensing. ' '8 2 This latest commitment to the continued existence and success of
LANDSAT intensifies the need for a clearly defined international policy in the area of satellite remote sensing.
Remote sensing plays a key role in the space business
today, ranking third in commercial importance behind
communication satellites and launch vehicles.8 This sector of the space industry is growing rapidly, as is evidenced by the marked increase in worldwide revenues
from 1985 to 1987.84 Continued growth is expected, with
some estimating that by the year 2000, remote sensing
will be a four billion dollar business.8 5 France, Russia, Japan, Canada, Brazil, India, and China are also becoming
active in remote sensing.86 The current optimism conId.
Id.
o Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 75, at 105 (statements of Peter Norris, executive vice president of the Earth Observation Satellite Company). Because of the
age of LANDSAT 5, EOSAT expected to have access to LANDSAT data only
through the end of 1988. (Hearings,supra note 75, at 105. With LANDSAT 6 not
expected to launch untilJune, 1991, this means the United States may have a gap
of a few years without LANDSAT service.
81 LANDSAT Program to Continue, supra note 73, at 49.
82 Id.
83 Cook & Lewis, Remote Sensing: New Applications Gain Acceptance, Avi. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Feb. 15, 1988, at 63 (advertiser sponsored market supplement).
84 Taranik, Specific Finds Spur Interest Star Wars Tools Aid Exploration, AM. A.
7.

79

PETROLEUM GEOLOGISTS EXPLORER, Oct. 1988, at 12. In 1985, worldwide raw data

sales yielded $125 million. These sales increased dramatically in 1987, totalling
$525 million. Id. at 17.
8-Cook & Lewis, supra note 83, at 63.
" Id.; see also Covault, China Evaluates Benefits, Intelligence Value of LANDSA T, Avi.
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cerning the future growth of LANDSAT is especially encouraging in light of the forecasts of an inadequate
commercial market for LANDSAT a few years ago.8 7
B.

Technical Background

LANDSAT's capabilities are impressive and extremely
useful to the natural resources industry. 88 Those exploring for minerals use remote sensing data in their efforts to
detect economically significant mineral deposits and oil
and gas reserves,8 9 relying predominantly on surface indicators. 90 Unfortunately, however, the LANDSAT program has not focused on the potential uses of remote
sensing in exploration.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 5, 1987, at 42-43 (the Chinese pay the United States
$600,000 per year to receive LANDSAT remote sensing imagery and have thus far
located several areas with high potential for mineral exploration). The French
launched their SPOT 1 satellite on February 21, 1986. This satellite has the
unique capability of acquiring images of the same area from two different angles,
which is particularly useful for geologic studies. Hearings,supra note 75, at 246-47
(testimony of David Julyan, vice president of SPOT Image Corp.). By 1991, the
Japanese will be receiving data from their geologically dedicated JERS- 1. Id. at
180, 183 (statements of Fred Henderson, president of GEOSAT, Inc.).
87 SeeJoyner, supra note 70, at 74; Note, supra note 69, at 104.
"" The LANDSAT satellites orbit the earth at approximately 913 km. above the
surface, and repeat their track over almost all the earth's land and some of the
oceans every 16 days. Fillippone, supra note 67, at 16-17. LANDSAT imagery has
several important advantages over conventional airborne photography, including
the ability to encompass an area of 34,225 sq. km. in each scene so that large
geologic features do not have to be pieced together from several hundred photographs. Also, the imagery is free of problems such as turbulence and inconsistent
light conditions. Id. at 17. LANDSATs 4 and 5 also have high quality image resolution which is particularly useful in mineral/energy exploration. Joyner, supra
note 70, at 65.
89 Hearings, supra note 75, at 178 (testimony of Dr. Fred Henderson, president
of the GEOSAT Committee, Inc.). "Hydrocarbon exploration from LANDSAT is
typically being accomplished in industry using conventional photogeologic interpretation, where image features such as tone, color, texture, and feature geometry
are interpreted in the light of the geologists [sic] experience and ground truth."
Id. The GEOSAT Committee was formed to assist the government in developing
a plan for a United States geology satellite, as a result of NASA's unwillingness to
do so. Id. at 179.
- Id. at 177 (testimony of Dr. Henderson). "Such evidence may be in the form
of observable structural features in sedimentary regions of favorable petroleum
host reservoir rocks, or natural seepage or alteration and attendant vegitation [sic]
or geochemical stress; geomorphic anomalies or characteristic geological associations." Id.
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Although new and improved technology is available,
the producers of satellites have been slow to provide
many of the remote sensing capabilities needed in geology. 9 t The reluctance to develop a more geologically oriented satellite may be at least partly attributable to the
depressed state of the minerals and petroleum industries
over the past several years.92 Another explanation is that
no government agency required the technology, and the
industry "was not prepared or able to fund such a satellite
system on its own, especially if it could not control the use
of the data amongst the industrial investors. ' 3 Despite
the somewhat slow growth of the remote sensing market
in the United States natural resources industry, encouraging signs of future expansion and use at the international
level exist.94 Unresolved legal issues surrounding remote
sensing have hindered the development of LANDSAT,
and resolution of these issues might further increase both
usage of the data, and the willingness to implement new
technology.
C. Applications of Remote Sensing in Exploration
Recently, remote sensing images have been used to detect changes in vegetation caused by the seepage of hydrocarbons from oil and gas deposits.95 For example,
vegetation anomalies present in the unmapped TefeCoari River basin led to the first major oil fielddiscovered
by remote sensing. 96 Three wells drilled in this basin are
producing a cumulative 3,000 barrels of oil perl day.9 7 AnillId. at 178. A group of 45 geologists from industry, academia, and government met in 1976 to recommend that future LANDSATs add certain technical
capabilities for geologic mapping. NASA implemented only a few-of the recommendations in LANDSATs 4 and 5. Id.
9'

Id.

93 Id. at 179.
94 Id. at 179-80.

For example, Japan designed its JERS-I satellite to be geologically dedicated to providing high quality data on mineral and energy resources.
Id. at 180-81.
1)5Taranik, supra note 84, at 12.

96 Id. at 14.
07 Id.
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other example of LANDSAT's economic value is the detection of previously unmapped copper deposits in
Pakistan in 1975 with LANDSAT data. 98 In general, satellite imagery is beneficial because it provides an additional
tool by which oil companies can attempt to minimize their
risk, both in evaluating leases before they are acquired,
and in evaluating the geology before test wells are
drilled. 99
Technological advances in LANDSAT's capabilities and
uses continue to be made, but legislation has not kept
pace.100 Foreign governments have different concerns and
philosophies regarding the remote sensing of their territories, and consequently, there is an ongoing international debate concerning the property rights to data
collected by satellite remote sensing.' 0 ' Although the
United States is a technological and economic leader in
this area, it has been slow to develop a clear and comprehensive policy of its own.t°2 The absence of a worldwide,
multilateral treaty on remote sensing presents serious
problems for satellite users.
D.

United States Policy

The United States policy on the international aspects of
remote sensing was set forth by Richard Nixon in 1969 at
the United Nations General Assembly when he pledged
that "this program will be dedicated to producing information not only for the U.S. but also for the world community."'' 0 3 In keeping with this policy, the United States
98 Joyner, supra note 70, at 69 (citing U.S. Probe Uncovers Copper, Wash. Post, Feb.
22, 1975, at A12, col. 1).
LANDSAT Feature Tested on Alaska's N. Slope, OIL & GAS J., May 28, 1984, at
141-42; see also Morgan, Recent Advancements in the Resolution of LANDSAT Imagery for
Geologic Mapping, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 23, 1985, at 66-67.
- Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing: A Look at American Law for an Approach to
Sensed States' Demands, 1985 FLETCHER F. 447 [hereinafter Problems of Remote
Sensing].
,o, Id. at 447-48.
102 Id. at 448.
103Nixon, Strengthening the Total Fabric of Peace, 61 DEP'T ST. BULL. 297, 301

(1969).
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has since promoted open and nondiscriminatory access to
LANDSAT data for all countries and their citizens. 0 4 The
United States permits foreign governments to own and
operate ground stations which maintain direct access to
LANDSAT, 1 5 and shares all accumulated LANDSAT data
0 6
with any country willing to pay for duplicating the data.1
Some countries expressed concern that the United States
government's transfer of LANDSAT to the private sector
might result in a change of policy towards foreign nations. 10 7 The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization
Act of 1984 should offer some assurance to these countries that the United States intends to continue its present
policies. With the passage of this Act, two policies established by the United States in the 1950s, "Open Skies"
and "Nondiscriminatory Access to Data," became law.' 0 8
1.

Open Skies Policy
The "Open Skies" policy is based on the principle that

Logsdon & Monk, Remote Sensingfrom Space: A Continuing Legal and Policy Issue,
L. 409, 415 (1983) [hereinafter Logsdon].
1om
Hearings, supra note 75, at 102 (statements of Peter Norris, executive vice
president of EOSAT). There are 13 foreign ground stations capable of receiving
LANDSAT's signal, and additional stations are planned. At a cost of between $10
and $15 million for each station, the number of stations reflects a serious commitment to the program. Id. at 102, 103.
104

8

ANNALS AIR & SPACE

1- Joyner, supra note 70, at 67.

,07 Note, supra note 69, at 114-17. Even within the United States, public and
private users fear that transferring the system to the private sector might disrupt
their operations. Id.; see also Logsdon, supra note 104, at 412-13. "There is no
question but that the political issues - the division of roles and responsibilities
between the public and private sector - are what drive, and complicate, all of the
discussions surrounding a permanent framework for land remote sensing." Logsdon, supra note 104, at 412.
108See Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4201-4292 (Supp. V 1987);Joyner, supra note 70, at 95-97; Note, supra note 69,
at 115; see also Hearings, supra note 75, at 180. In response to potential concern
over the conversion of remote sensing data from a public good into a commercial
commodity, § 4203 of the Act specifies that it is the policy of the United States to
continue to provide nondiscriminatory access to unenhanced, civilian data for all
potential users, and to honor its international obligations. 15 U.S.C. § 4203(b),
(c). The promise to honor its international obligations indicates an intent to adhere to the United States "Open Skies" policy as well. Hearings, supra note 75, at
181 (statement of Dr. Fred Henderson, president of the GEOSAT Committee,
Inc.).
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no territorial sovereignty extends legally into outer
space.10 9 In other words, any nation may launch a satellite
into orbit, provided that no international space treaty is
violated. While the United States has encouraged other
nations to comply with this policy, it has yet to be specifically adopted as a principle of international law."0 Article
I of the Outer Space Treaty, however, appears to support
the open skies policy."'
2.

Nondiscriminatory Access Policy

Nondiscriminatory access to data is also required by the
1984 Act." t2 Accordingly, unenhanced data" 3 must be
made available to all potential users "without preference,
bias, or any other special arrangement ... regarding delivery, format, financing, or technical considerations
which would favor one buyer or class of buyers over another."' " 14 In other words, the same information that is
available to a foreign nation, is also available to a private
109 See generally National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 245 12484 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (establishing U.S. commitment to the policy as an
expression of international law).
1o

Note, supra note 69, at 115.

,,1Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, art. 1, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (the "Outer
Space Treaty").
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall
be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination
of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.
Id.

15 U.S.C. § 4203(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
113"Unenhanced data" is defined by the Act as "unprocessed or minimally
processed signals or film products collected from civil remote sensing space systems." 15 U.S.C. § 4204(4) (Supp. 11 1984).
11
15 U.S.C. § 4204(3)(A) (Supp. 11 1984).
112
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exploration company, and at the same price." 15
E.

Foreign Concerns

Although remote sensing data can be very beneficial to
developing nations," 16 many of these nations nevertheless17
express concern over having their territories sensed."
They fear the data will benefit other countries or private
companies to the detriment of the sensed state." 8 A possible explanation for this concern is that these nations do
not feel adequately protected under existing international
law from abuses of remote sensing technology.'9
Although some general and rather vague provisions of the
Outer Space Treaty can be read to impose limitations on
remote sensing simply because the sensing is done in
space, the treaty does not specifically reference remote
sensing.12 0 A key issue yet to be resolved is whether developing countries can demand the opportunity to consent before being sensed.
F.

The Different Views on Prior Consent

1. Advocates of Prior Consent
The governments of most developing countries cannot
afford to launch their own satellites, and believe that they
115 Note, supra note 69, at 115.
"U.S. adherence to non-discriminatory access
underscores a commitment to the free flow of information ....
[and] is a part of
the 'open skies' principle that is at the core of U.S. space policy." Id.
116 Remote sensing data can be particularly useful to developing nations in
monitoring crop growth, in exploring for underground water reservoirs, and in
exploring for economic concentrations of minerals and metals. Note, supra note
69, at 104.
17 See Note, Explorations in Space Law: An Examination of the Legal Issues Raised by
Geostationary, Remote Sensing, and Direct BroadcastingSatellites, 29 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv.
687, 722 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Explorations in Space].
118Note, supra note 69, at 115. For example, "private companies in the developed world may use remote-sensing data to gain advantages in commodity market
trading or in negotiations regarding mineral concessions." Id.
ill, Note, Explorationsin Space, supra note 117, at 722-23.
,20 Id. at 723. "Because it is unclear whether the drafters of this treaty intended
to prohibit or seriously inhibit remote sensing, vague provisions of the treaty are,
indeed, not precise enough to act as legal directives binding nations that operate
remote sensing satellites." Id.
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should have the right to give their consent before being
sensed.'2' These governments advocate a very restrictive
framework whereby the sensed nation would have an exclusive right to information concerning its resources, as
well as absolute control over the dissemination of this information.' 22 The leaders of these countries also believe
that the sensed state should have the right of first access
to the information regarding their territories,* claiming
sovereignty over national resources. 123 The developing
countries interpret a 1962 resolution passed in the General Assembly of the United Nations as recognizing the
right to authorize, restrict, or prohibit the exploration of
24
their natural resources. 1
Similarly, the governments of the Eastern bloc countries believe all nations have an inalienable right to dispose of their natural resources and information
pertaining to those resources, and that this right should
be respected. 25 These countries met in Moscow in 1978
and signed the Convention on the Transfer and Use of
26
Data of the Remote Sensing of Earth from Outer Space. 1
The participants in the convention agreed that information about a state's natural resources should not be disclosed without the "explicit consent" of the sensed
state. 27 The USSR specifically rejected the idea that remote sensing data should be freely purchased because
121

725.

Brazil and Argentina originally advanced the prior consent approach. Id. at

Id. at 728.
Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 452. Many of these
countries feel that remote sensing of their territory, without their prior consent, is
a direct infringement on their national sovereignty. Id.
214 Id. The resolution provided that "exploration ...of [natural] resources...
should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization,
restriction, or prohibition of such activities." G.A. Res. 1803, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 7) at 15, U.N. Doc. A15207 (1962).
12-1 See Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 454 (citing the
Convention on the Transfer and Use of Data of the Remote Sensing of Earth from
Outer Space, May 19, 1978, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE &
TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., SPACE LAW 490 (Comm. Print 1978)).
1211
See, Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 454.
127 Id.
122
123
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that would "constitute a free market in remote sensing
data." 12 8 The USSR also proposed that the sensing state
should have international responsibility for any serious
2 9
damage caused by the dissemination of the data.1
Clearly, these views conflict with those of the United
States.
2.

Opponents of Prior Consent

The United States opposes the prior consent approach,
and instead advocates free collection and open dissemination of the satellite data. 30 The western industrialized
countries agree with the United States view. 13 Today,
France is apparently complying with these policies in regard to its SPOT program, 3 2 andJapan's stated intention
is to comply as well.' 33 Because the United States established these policies and has been the primary supporter
of their continued existence, some Americans fear that
any waiver in the United States commitment to satellite
remote sensing might influence
more countries to covet
13 4
their data for themselves.
G.

UNCOPUOS Principles

The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of
Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) is attempting to address and
resolve the major legal issues involved in remote sensing.
The committee drafted fifteen principles to serve as international guidelines for remote sensing. Major differences
of opinion exist amongst the world's nations, however,
Id. at 453.
Id.
13oNote, Explorations in Space, supra note 117, at 726.
'-1 Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 454.
.'.2Hearings, supra note 75, at 246-49. The French remote sensing satellite is the
SPOT IMAGE, which produces data very similar to LANDSAT. The first SPOT
satellite was launched in 1986, and the French hope to compete with LANDSAT.
Id. at 246, 249.
- Id. at 181 (statements of Mr. Fred Henderson, president of the GEOSAT
Committee, Inc.).
"

129

1.14

Id. at 174.
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35

and these principles are disputed.
Two principles are of particular interest from the
United States perspective with respect to remote sensing.
Principle XIII requires the sensing state to notify the
United Nations and, if requested, the sensed state as soon
as practicable.1 36 By not requiring prior consent, the
principle appears to favor the United States policy. Principle XII, which provides that sensed states shall have a
right of access to primary, processed, and analyzed data
on a "non-discriminatory" basis, 37 is also in line with
United States policy. It should be noted, however, that
other principles sharply conflict with the United States
viewpoint. 3 8 The inability of the countries to agree on
the principles of state sovereignty and prior consent has
prevented a final draft of the principles. 139
H. Applying Private Law Concepts to Remote Sensing
As in the area of geophysical trespass, American private
law concepts have been suggested as applicable to issues
40
concerning information obtained from remote sensing.
One commentator suggests copyright law, the right to privacy, and trade secret law as theories which might provide
a framework for analyzing a landowner's rights in regard
to remote sensing.' 4 ' Application of these theories, however, is problematic.
,35 Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 456; Note, Exploration
in Space, supra note 117, at 724; see M. BENKO, W. DE GRAAFF & G. REIJNEN, SPACE
LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONs 22 (1985) [hereinafter M. BENKO & G. REIJNEN].

,3r Note, Explorations in Space, supra note 117, at 727 n. 268 (citing U.N. Doc.
A/AC 105/305 (1982)).
,37 U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/305 (1982); see also M. BENKO & G. REIJNEN, supra note
135, at 20-27, 35-37 (for a complete listing and discussion of the principles).
."8 Joyner, supra note 70, at 92 nn. 191, 194 (citing principles XV and XVI
which respectively require the sensed state's approval before disseminating the
data, and recognize the sensed state's sovereignty over the natural resources).
1.''M. BENKO & G. REUNEN, supra note 135, at 2-3.
140
141

Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 457-65.
Id.
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Copyright

Applying copyright protection to remotely sensed data
requires that the data be analogized to other "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible means of expression," such as a painting.' 4 2 The people of the nation own
the copyrighted original, the land mass and natural resources. Thus, it is argued, the state has the exclusive
right to reproduce the original. 4 3 Exploration companies
44
could purchase this right by paying the state a royalty.1
An obvious difficulty in the application of copyright
concepts to remote sensing is that, unlike a painting or
45
literary work, natural resources are not man-made.
Further, the state is in no way responsible for "putting the
information into a tangible medium." '46 As a result, the
sensed state appears
to have no property rights in the
47
LANDSAT data.
2.

Right to Privacy

It is generally accepted in the United States that an individual has a right to privacy, and is therefore protected
from having his portrait or photograph used for advertising or trade purposes without his authorization. 48 Arguably, a sensed state should have a similar right to
privacy with respect to satellite images of its territory
which are used for trade purposes. 149 Under this view, the
sensed state should have the right to authorize or prohibit
the use of remote sensing imagery of its territory. 5 0 Presently, it is unclear whether a state is entitled to privacy of
this type. Even if the sensed state cannot bring suit, however, the individual landowners involved might bring a
142

Id. at 458 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976)).

14.

id. at 459.

Id.
"43Id. at 458.

144

146

Id.

147 Id.

148

Id. at 460.

349

Id.

'-

Id. at 461.
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class action based on an invasion of their right to privacy. 15 As mentioned in the discussion of unauthorized
geophysical surveys, the right to privacy has traditionally
protected personal rights rather than commercial rights
arising out of real property. 5 2 Therefore, the applicability of privacy concepts to remote sensing is doubtful.
3.

Trade Secrets
Information regarding the location of natural resources
and the means of extraction has been argued to fall under
the protection of some countries' trade secret laws.15 3 E./.
duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,154 an American case,
appears to support this argument. In finding that the
Christophers had improperly obtained DuPont's trade secret by taking aerial photos of DuPont's facility, the court
noted that "[t]o obtain knowledge of a process without
spending the time and money to discover it independently
is improper unless the holder voluntarily discloses it or fails
to take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy." 155
It is argued that secrets vital to a state's development of
its natural resources could be improperly obtained by remote sensing, and, like DuPont, the sensed state should
not be required to go to enormous
and unreasonable ex56
pense to guard its secrets.
Application of the law of trade secrets to remote sensing presents the same problems as does the application of
trade secret laws to unauthorized geophysical exploration. 57 Remote sensing data is used to discover natural
resources, and not the knowledge of a process which has
been invented by man.
I.

Id.

See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
,.3Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 462.
,-54
431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); see supra
notes 43-48 and accompanying text for the facts of Christopher.
, Christopher, 431 F.2d at 1015-16. The court also noted that "[t]o require
DuPont to put a roof over the unfinished plant to guard its secret would impose
an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a school boy's trick." Id.
' Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 463.
, See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
'.2
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I. Application of the Fourth Amendment
Worth noting is a recent Supreme Court case addressing the implications of the fourth amendment on aerial
photography, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States. 15 8 Dow
maintained tight security around its premises and investigated all low flying aircraft in an effort to conceal its facilities. 159 Dow granted an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) request to inspect two of its powerplants, and then
16
denied EPA's request for a second on-site inspection.
Instead of seeking an administrative search warrant, the
EPA employed an aerial photographer to take photos of
the site. 6 ' Dow brought suit alleging that the EPA had
violated the fourth amendment and exceeded its "statutory investigative authority" by conducting a warrantless
62
search.1
The Supreme Court held that the taking of unauthorized aerial photos of the industrial plant complex was not
a search prohibited by the fourth amendment, and that
the EPA acted within the scope of its authority. 163 In
reaching its decision, the Court focused on the nature of
the property involved, noting that the privacy interests of
an individual homeowner differ significantly from those of
a commercial property owner.' 64 Unlike a homeowner, a
commercial property owner does not expect his property
1- 476 U.S. 227 (1986); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (warrantless police aerial photographs of marijuana taken from within the navigable
airspace above the curtilage of defendant's home did not violate the fourth
amendment).
's

Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 229.
/d.
Io

1.1

Id.

162 Id.

at 230. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1w, Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239; see also Bender, The Fourth Amendment in the Age
of Aerial Surveillance: Curtainsfor the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725 (1985).
,- Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 237-38.
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to be free from any inspections. 165 Therefore, the government has more latitude in conducting warrantless inspec66
tions of commercial property. 1
The Court also referred to the curtilage and the "open
fields" doctrines. While the fourth amendment protects
an individual's reasonable and legitimate expectation of
privacy in the curtilage area immediately surrounding his
private home, it does not shelter activities in open fields
from governmental interference or surveillance. 67 Dow's
plant fell somewhere in between the "open fields" doctrine and the curtilage doctrine, but the Court concluded
1 68
the plant was more comparable to an open field.
Because the government still provides most of the funding for LANDSAT, the fourth amendment may be applicable when a landowner's property is sensed. Under the
Dow Chemical holding, the undeveloped land which is
sensed would probably fall within the "open fields" exception to the warrant requirement. The Court suggested, however, that government use of satellite
technology for purposes of surveillance might be proscribed by the Constitution, if a warrant was not obtained. 6 19 While the majority's comment reflects the
Court's concern about the government's use of advancing
technology as a possible invasion of an individual's privacy rights, a strong argument exists against application
of the fourth amendment to satellite remote sensing for
10 Id. at 238.

1- Id. at 237.
167 Id. at 235-36.
- Id. at 236, 239. "[S]uch an industrial complex is more comparable to an
open field and as such it is open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft
lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the area for
the reach of cameras." Id. at 239.
1-OId. at 238. "It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of
private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally
proscribed absent a warrant." Id. The dissent rejected the majority's distinction
between satellite technology and the highly sophisticated camera used in Dow
Chemical, remarking that "[s]atellite photography hardly could have been more
informative about Dow's technology." Id. at 251 n.13.
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exploration purposes. 170
III.

AIRBORNE SURVEYS

& REMOTE

SENSING:

Is

THERE A

DUTY TO DISCLOSE?

Assume that an airborne geophysical survey has indicated a structure or anomaly. The surveying exploration
company might decide to lease the surveyed property, believing it to have high potential for economic quantities of
hydrocarbons or minerals. Should the lessee disclose to
the potential lessor that the lessee surveyed the property?
If the lessee chooses not to disclose the information, is it
possible for the lessor to later rescind the lease on the
basis of fraud? While these issues have been discussed to
a limited extent in the realm of geophysical exploration,
they have received even less attention in the international
realm of satellite remote sensing. Suppose a mineral exploration company in the United States purchased LANDSAT data which indicated a huge, economic deposit in an
undeveloped country. Should the exploration company
be able to go in and lease the foreign property at a low
cost, without disclosing that the property has been
sensed? And if exploration companies are required to
make such disclosures, what would be the effect on their
incentive to explore? How would the disclosure requirement be policed?
170

First, in response to the Dow Chemical Court's concern with "highly sophisti-

cated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public," it should be
noted that LANDSAT data is available to the public. Second, the land being
sensed in the exploration for natural resources, usually undeveloped ranch or
farm land, would fall within the "open fields" doctrine. Third, the Court's concern appears to be with the invasion of personal privacy interests, as opposed to
property interests. The Court distinguished the use of "some unique sensory device that .

.

. could penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversations"

from "a conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking." Id. at 238. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Court would apply the
fourth amendment to satellite remote sensing for exploration purposes. One
commentator noted that although LANDSAT would not fall within the fourth

amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure, Dow Chemical does
point out the need for establishing legal guidelines for satellite technology.
Events of Interest, California v. Ciraolo and Dow Chemical v. U.S. - A View From
Above. Is It Ever Private?, 14 J. SPACE L. 172, 174 (1986).
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Disclosure of Geophysical Operations and Data

Exploration companies routinely attempt to lease mineral rights from landowners who know little or nothing
about the mineral value of their property.'17 While an exploration company will normally obtain as much information as possible to properly evaluate the mineral value of a
piece of land, the mineral owner may not have the desire,
expertise, or financial capability to do so.' 72 Once obtained, this geophysical data represents the lessee's deliberate investment of time, money, and expertise. 73 In
return for his expenditures, the lessee hopes to make a
profit. It is important to remember, however, that exploration is an inherently risky business. There is no guarantee that the lessee will be successful in his efforts, t74 and
the law generally supports the proposition that the exploration company has no duty to disclose its knowledge
of
75
the mineral quality of the land to the lessor.
- Barnhill & Enns, Choosing Between an Honest Bargainand No Bargain:Information
Disclosure to Potential Lessors, 2 E. MIN. L. FOUND. 1, 1-2 (1981) [hereinafter
Barnhill].
172 Id.; see also 4 W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS § 662, at 149 (1962) (stating that the
superior knowledge the prospective lessee acquires by geophysical methods about
the minerals beneath the land is no different in principle than the superior knowledge any other prospective purchaser might obtain to evaluate a horse, a painting
or a diamond).
173 See Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (1978).
,14 See Home-Stake Royalty Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 594 P.2d 1207,
1210 (Okla. 1979) (holding that the lessee was not required to divulge its geologic
studies in a pooling proceeding, and that any conclusions as to the future production of the contemplated well based on the studies in question would be "problematic, conjectural, and [dependent] in great part upon the expertise of the
persons making the evaluation.").
11. Neill v. Shamburg, 158 Pa. 263, 27 A. 992 (1893) (lessee had no duty to
disclose information which caused him to believe oil existed beneath the lessor's
land to the lessor, who did not have this knowledge); 4 W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS
§ 662 (1962)
There is no authority, and there appears to be no sound reason for
holding that a prospective purchaser or lessee of oil or gas lands
should be under any duty to disclose his knowledge of the mineral
quality of the land gained by geophysical methods of testing when
he does not have that duty, if the information is acquired by other
superior and scientific acquirements .... He [the lessee] has simply
through his superior knowledge of the laws of physical matter been
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There are exceptions to the general rule that a lessee
has no duty to disclose information gained by geophysical
operations. First, the parties must be dealing at arm's
length. If the parties have a confidential or fiduciary relationship, the lessee clearly has the duty to exercise utmost
good faith, including the duty to fully and fairly disclose
all material facts. 176 In an arm's length transaction, the
lessee may remain silent, but if he decides to speak, "he
must disclose enough to prevent his words from being
misleading."1 77 Further, if the exploration company is
found to have made an affirmative misrepresentation to
the landowner, the contract may be subject to
rescission. 178
Of particular interest is a Canadian case where the
lessee, Texas Gulf Sulphur, discovered a rich mine after
conducting extensive airborne surveys. 1 79 A large anomaly on the surveys indicated the presence of a massive
sulphide deposit of copper, zinc, and silver.18 0 The lessee
able to learn something as to the quality of the lessor's land which he
is under no duty to divulge to the lessor ....As long as the parties
deal at arm's length there is no duty on the part of the lessee to
disclose information gained by geophysical tests.
Id. at 148-49; see also Kronman, supra note 173, at 21. Allowing nondisclosure of
proprietary geophysical data in effect protects the lessee in case he is wrong and
encourages him to continue to take the risk and explore, which benefits society as
a whole.
,76RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977); see also Barnhill, supra note
171, at 5 (citing Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (If there is a fiduciary or agency relationship, or another
relationship of trust and confidence, there arises the duty to make "a complete
and unreserved disclosure of all material facts and circumstances when entering
into any transaction with the principal.")).
'77 W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 106 (1984).
17aBarnhill, supra note 171, at 3. Affirmative misrepresentation is based on five
elements: (1) a representation was made, (2) the representation was false, (3) the
representation was material to the contract, (4) the representation was made with
the intent to deceive the other party so as to induce that party to enter into the
contract, and (5) the representation did in fact induce the other party to enter the
contract. Id. Upon a finding of affirmative misrepresentation, the transaction is
voidable at the option of the defrauded party. Id.
179 Leitch Gold Mines Ltd. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 1 O.R. 469,469-70 (High
Ct. ofJustice 1968); see also Barnhill, supra note 171, at 26-27; Kronman, supra note
173, at 21.
- Texas Gulf Sulphur, 1 O.R. at 469-70.
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purchased options covering the mineral rights from the
surrounding property owners without disclosing its information regarding the potential value of the property. 8 '
The deposit was later estimated to be worth two billion
dollars, and the lessors brought suit against the lessee,
2 The parties
claiming it had intentionally misled them. 8 83
court.
of
out
lawsuit
eventually settled the
Texas Gulf Sulphur spent four years and almost three
million dollars exploring the anomalies before making its
two billion dollar discovery.' 84 As one commentator
noted, the only effective way for Texas Gulf Sulphur to
profit from its information was to purchase the mineral
and surface rights for the land on which the anomaly was
located without disclosing its information. 18 5 If Texas
Gulf Sulphur had disclosed the surveys, rising lease prices
might have prevented the company from recovering its
86
original expenditures.
One commentator suggests requiring limited disclosure
by an exploration company before it leases the property
of interest. 87 In order to protect itself against a later
claim of fraud, the exploration company would be required to tell the lessor that it had proprietary geophysical
data without disclosing any further information.' 88 Some
argue that this result is fair because it requires the surrender of the "illegitimate value of the information," while
allowing the bona fide proprietary value of the data to be
retained. 8 9 The obvious disadvantage to the lessee in
18, Id. at 469-70, 489-93.
"'
's
184

Id. at 470-71.
Kronman, supra note 173, at 20.
Id. at 21.

1- See id. at 20, 21 & n.57.
186 In analyzing what might have occurred had Texas Gulf Sulphur sold its information to the landowners, two problems become apparent: (1) convincing the
landowners "of the value of the information without actually disclosing it," and
(2) convincing all of the landowners "to purchase the information jointly-since
... no single owner could pay a price that would compensate the corporation for
the costs it had incurred in obtaining [the information]." Id. at 21 n.57.
187 Barnhill, supra note 171, at 26-27.
'8

Id.
89Id. at 27.
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this scenario is that the price of the lease would almost
certainly increase.
There are several problems with this proposal. First,
the courts have not found the value of information acquired by unauthorized geophysical operations without
an actual surface invasion to be illegitimate. 90 Second,
requiring an exploration company to disclose that it has
geophysical information seems to imply that, in fact, commercial quantities of oil, gas, or other minerals exist on
the property. In reality, the lessee is gambling on the accuracy of its interpretation. The price of the lease increases because of the limited disclosure, and if an
economic discovery is not made, the lessee bears the burden. In effect, limited disclosure will serve as a disincentive to exploration. Also, it can be argued that anytime a
lessee offers to lease mineral rights, the owner of the
rights has constructive notice that the lessee has reason to
believe the land has special value. The landowner is always free to ask a prospective lessee whether the lessee
has geophysical information covering the property, since
the lessee cannot make an affirmative misrepresentation
without jeopardizing the entire transaction.
B.

Disclosure of Remote Sensing

The governments of many undeveloped nations believe
that developed countries with the finances to purchase
LANDSAT data and the technological capabilities to process and interpret the data have an unfair advantage.' 9 '
Even though the United States makes the LANDSAT data
equally available to all nations, some nations lack the ability to analyze the data, and thus, it is argued that the access is not equal. 92 For example, if a country the size of
'

See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.

Branscomb, supra note 73, at 1010. "Many third world nations feel unprepared to compete with the activities of nonnational business organizations that
seek to develop [the] natural resources . . . of these countries. Outsiders with
access to [LANDSAT] data may know more about the third world nations than the
nations do themselves." Id.
"'

''" Id. at 1010-11.
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Kenya were to purchase an inventory of its mineral deposits from a private company, a geographically and technically complete high resolution study might cost more than
fifteen million dollars. 9 3 The cost of such an inventory is
prohibitive for many poor nations. As a result, undeveloped countries advocate the right to give their consent
prior to the sensing, as well as the right of first access to
the data. 194 Although a regulation requiring disclosure to
sensed states of a list of those buying data covering their
states seems like a simple way to protect the interests of
these states, this type of regulation was specifically rejected in the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization
95
Act. 1
CONCLUSION

In the future, satellite remote sensing is likely to play an
increasingly important role in exploration for oil, gas, and
other minerals. As the use of remote sensing becomes
more commonplace, conflicts between mineral owners
and exploration companies are sure to arise. Clear legal
guidelines are important to all the parties involved.
Under the existing case law, a landowner has no remedy
for unauthorized geophysical surveys of his property conducted from adjacent property, surrounding roads, or
from the air. 196 Several commentators have proposed various theories of relief for such unauthorized geophysical
operations, but the courts have not addressed any of these
theories. It is important to note, however, that airborne
surveys are considerably less intrusive than conventional
seismic surveys.' 9 7 Similarly, satellite remote sensing is
even less intrusive than airborne surveys, in that the data
13 Note, supra note 69, at 121 (illustrating how difficult it would be to correct
the information imbalance).
1,4 Comment, Problems of Remote Sensing, supra note 100, at 452.
:'i' 15 U.S.C. § 4204(3)(C) (Supp. V 1987) ("The sale of data on a nondiscriminatory basis does not require ... that a system operator disclose names of buyers
or their purchases.").
"i" See supra notes 10-39 and accompanying text.
1"
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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is collected from outer space. The United States government has rejected the notion that a landowner's authorization is necessary before his land can be sensed by
satellite. 19 If exploration companies are not liable for remote sensing conducted without a landowner's authorization, how can the courts draw a line between such sensing
and airborne geophysical surveys?
The issues surrounding remote sensing are complicated
because of the international politics involved. The United
States government has long advocated free collection and
open dissemination of satellite data. 99 Under these theories, a landowner has no right to 1) give his consent prior
to the sensing, 2) receive notice that the land was sensed,
or 3) control the dissemination of the data. The United
States policy promotes international cooperation, and
also recognizes the difficulty involved in trying to restrict
satellite remote sensing to small areas. 0 0 While many developing and communist countries oppose this policy, it is
imperative that the United States and its supporters adhere to it. The suggestion that common law theories be
applied to provide an American landowner relief for the
unauthorized sensing of his land is in direct conflict with
this nation's international policy and should therefore be
rejected.
To require lessees to disclose their use of satellite remote sensing or airborne geophysical surveys to potential
'""

See supra note 130 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
See Note, Explorations in Space, supra note 117, at 732.
Because the satellites cannot be turned off and their "footprints"
cannot be shaped to the contours of individual nations, the only way
to assure that a satellite will not survey the resources of an objecting
nation would either be to program the satellite so it does not orbit in
that part of the world or to remove information inadvertently gathered about that state when that information is processed. The former solution would reduce the value of the data received because
significant parts of the Earth would not be sensed, and the latter
approach would slow down processing time while increasing costs to
the point that satellite remote sensing would lose many of the advantages it has over Earth-based sensing systems.
Id. at 732-33.
2
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lessors would also be very detrimental to the exploration
for natural resources. Exploration companies expend
great amounts of time and money in obtaining this technological data, as well as in developing an expertise in interpreting the data. Any conclusion by the lessee that
minerals exist on a particular property is speculative, and
the decision to lease the property in question is inherently
risky. As one judge put it, the lessee's failure to disclose
its knowledge is "[nothing] more than a positive intention
and effort to reap the benefit of his enterprise, . . . [and]
this 'falls far short of establishing fraud.' "o201 While requiring the lessee to disclose that the land has been
sensed would almost certainly reduce the explorationist's
incentive to use remote sensing in exploration, to require
the lessee to allow the mineral owner first access to the
data and control of its dissemination, as proposed by
some developing countries, might stifle such exploration
altogether. These disclosure requirements would also be
extremely difficult to enforce. At a time when needed natural resources are becoming increasingly difficult to locate, legal guidelines in the area of remote sensing should
strive to encourage and provide incentives to exploration
companies willing to invest large amounts of time and
money in modern exploration technology.

20,
Neill v. Shamburg, 158 Pa. 263, 27 A. 992, 993 (1893) (holding that where
the lessee had knowledge which caused him to believe that oil existed beneath the
lessor's land, and the lessor did not have this knowledge, the lessee had no duty to
disclose his information).

